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Abstract 
This paper aims to compare these two cases, to create a clear 
problematic overview, which representing today these countries 
to regional and global security, and solving this dispute with 
adequate means. By comparing the legal, political and 
diplomatic effects of these two nuclear programs, which affect 
the most powerful security strategies of countries in the world, 
this work paper  intends to draw a line between their differences.  
The methodology to be used in this paper, it will be analysis of 
literature, international legal acts and declarations of the states’ 
representatives which are involved in resolving the crisis or 
which are part of the problem. 
The findings of this study relate to that: even existing of common 
elements between these cases, there are important differences 
between them. The same applicable legal instruments and 
diplomatic means resolution of these crises do not have the same 
effects on them. This it makes that each of this case to be unique, 
and unmatched in resolving the crisis. 
Taken into consideration the existing literature on this issue, this 
paper modestly trying to fulfill the scientific gap in terms of 
finding the differences in these cases, as well as possible 
application instruments in resolving the nuclear crisis in the 
future. 
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Introduction 
 
Considering that, in the case of North Korea’s nuclear program, 
in scientific terms we can freely say that the entire international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime used by international 
stakeholders to stop DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea) of enriching the atomic bomb, has failed. Regarding the 
nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the time of 
writing this article, the process  of enriching uranium is halted 
up to 5%, as a result of achieving a comprehensive agreement 
between the P5 + 1 (the US, the Russian Federation, China, Great 
Britain, France and Germany on one side and  Iran on the other 
hand). 
Both of these cases have international legal significance, 
because a few of a legal instruments (sanctions) are applied, 
some have been successful in certain periods of time, and later 
failed. Some have had their effect on the use of a state, while the 
other did not have the same effect.  From political and 
international relations perspective, both these cases pose 
challenges during the drawing political strategies by the great 
powers, in the realizing and protecting their vital interests. 
Regarding to the security of these countries, also affects the 
primary in developing security policies, to neighboring states. 
 
Similarities and differences  
 
The nuclear crisis is a serious confrontation between the 
defenders of international norms, which offer the best chance for 
peace and stability of a rouge state who seems to intent on 
owning weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which give them 
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opportunity to threaten the stability, only to protect their 
political regime interest.1 
Obviously the comparison of Iran's nuclear crisis with the 
nuclear crisis of North Korea should begin by analyzing and 
comparing the political regimes in these two countries. Optimists 
in their point of view on Iran case have in mind, the historical 
civilization, Iran's major trading power;  continuously increasing 
the oil wealth,  a young generation, the most pluralist country 
than any other country in the Middle East.2 Since the division of 
the Korean Peninsula as a result of the Second World War, North 
Korea has been led by just three people: Kim Il-sung and his son 
Kim Jong-il, and recently by grandson Kim Jong–un.3 North 
Korea remains the only self-isolated country of the world and its 
government is one of the darkest in the earth.4 Both regimes 
(North Korea and Iran) are formed and led by charismatic 
demagogue, with high rhetoric level of action against the classes’ 
war and socially riched and corrupted people. But one of the 
highlighted differences lies in the religious motives and 
justifications of Khomeini's (spiritual leader of the Islamic 
revolution, 1979), which can not be found in North Korea”s 
leader. Khomeini has urged his revolution against 
mismanagement, material misuse and secularism as a domestic 
                                                     
1 Gilbert, Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties 
Caught between 
North Korea and the United States, Palgrave, Macmillian, 2007, pg.27. 
2 Patrick M. Cronin, Double Trouble, Iran and North Korea as Challenges to 
International Security, Praeger Security International, Westport, ConnecticutLondon, 
2008, pg.11. 
3 John, Ishiyama, “Assessing the leadership transition in North Korea: Using network 
analysis of ﬁeld inspections”, 1997-2012, Department of Political Science, University 
of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle # 305340, Wooten Hall, Room No. 166, Denton, 
TX 76203-5340, United States, 2014, pg.1. 
4 Patrick M. Cronin, Double Trouble, Iran and North Korea as Challenges to 
International Security, Praeger Security International,Westport, 
ConnecticutLondon,2008, pg.79. 
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leader, while Kim II-sung, took the initiative together with other 
nationalists to free his country from foreign colonialists. 
Khomeini was a religious scholar with the idea of establishing 
good governance, while Kim Il-sung was an uneducated 
guerrilla fighter, where the necessity to think about governance 
it came out only after the defeating of Japan. Kim Il- sung has 
created an ideological system based on anti-imperialist sense, 
has incorporated a socialist economy, but ultimately is not an 
ideology that has the major benefit of a world religion to justify 
his role or making promises of reward in the next life. It has 
invested more efforts to promote ideological indoctrination 
dissent stifle and to ensure his rule. These differences have 
produced two political systems and different foundations, 
different type of state. North Korea and Iran are essentially 
different countries.5 Although both countries follow some 
important policies of foreign vital interest to the United States, 
yet they exist in different regions, cultural divergence, security 
needs, and extraordinary economies, different ideologies with 
very different religious and political concepts.6 But regarding the 
nuclear programs of two countries, the Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu, has tried to identify as a similar both of them. In his 
speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations in New 
York, said that Iran should not be allowed to repeat the North 
Korea’s wiles to possess nuclear weapons.7 Based on their 
statements by Secretary of State John Kerry, after pressure from 
the Israeli authorities that the issue of Iran is going on the same 
                                                     
5 McEachern, North Korea and Iran, Drawing Comparative Lessons, U.S.-Korea 
Institute at SAIS, 2011, pg. 12. 
6  Ibid, pg.20. 
7 Lazaroff, Tovah, “Netanyahu to compare Iran with North Korea in UN speech”, The 
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path as North Korea’s one, Kerry refused to make comparisons 
between the nuclear deal with Iran and the agreement negotiated 
in the past with North Korea8. During an interview on CNN, on 
25 November 2013, Kerry was asked in this form: "Many people 
say that Iran wills the same as North Korea, a country that temporarily 
agree to stop its nuclear ambitions in order to lift the sanctions and then 
secretly goes forward and continues with its nuclear program. Why do 
you think that the case of Iranian nuclear program is not similar to the 
case of the North Korea’s nuclear program? US Secretary -Kerry 
responded in that way, comparing the details of the two cases, 
where: 
First, Iran is "a member of the NPT". 
Second, Iranians "are involved in the negotiations". 
Third, Iranians "are being committed daily inspections to a 
certain facilities and to limit their activities with these 
inspections." 
The fourth- Iranians "have stated publicly that they would not 
build nuclear weapons," In contrast with Iran, he added that ” 
North Korea already has nuclear weapons and tested them and has not 
declared any denuclearization and disarmament policy. So there are 
many different things, and that we should try to find the possibility of 
using a diplomatic solution with Iran”. 9But critics to the above 
mentioned declaration cite other facts adding that the Clinton 
administration had negotiated with North Korea and signed 
Agreement Framework in Geneva almost two decades ago, 
North Korea was also "a member of NP", and it had threatened 
in 1993 to withdraw from the treaty. North Korea also had 
                                                     
8 The Framework Agreement signed in 1994 between the United States and North 
Korea, 
9 Patrick, Goodenough, “Kerry Misleads in Saying There's No Comparison Between 
Iran and N. Korea Nuke Deals”, CNN, news, November 25, 2013, 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/kerry-misleads-saying-theres-
no-comparison-between-iran-and-n-korea. 
North Korea’s and Iranian Nuclear Program- Comperative aproach 
58  Thesis, no.1, 2016      
"negotiations" (Reconciliation Framework was signed after four 
months of bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang).10 
North Korea had also stated publicly that they would not build 
nuclear weapons "(Common Declaration of the South - North for 
Decnularisation of the Korean Peninsula" signed in 1991). 
Pyongyang said it would try to produce, acquire, own, decide, 
or use one of these nuclear weapons. According to the critics only 
one of the four reasons quoted by Kerry was probably correct. 
Unlike the agreement with Iran, in the Declaration of Conformity 
is not determined "daily inspections" of nuclear IAEA facilities 
in North Korea, but it had allowed the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to "monitoring” to specified nuclear facilities, 
and to conduct "ad hoc routine inspections of facilities".11 
Efforts to understand what military capabilities have two 
countries; it is certain that both of them have the ability to 
influence in formulating the United States security policies and 
their neighbors. The US has decided to expand its missile defense 
in Alaska, to counter a possible military attack with ballistic 
missile from North Korea. Also the threat from Iran similarly has 
driven US planning missile defense, arms sales and other 
political decisions. Iran and North Korea also share some 
important features, both governed by authoritarian regimes, 
both countries have issued threats of concern for neighbors who 
are allies of the US and both have remained inconsistent, despite 
the severe punishment and stringent international sanctions. 
However, in terms of capacity, countries should not technically 
be grouped in the same category for a very clear reason for North 
                                                     
10 Agreed Framework between The United States of America and The Democratic 
People’s Republic Of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1994. 
11 Patrick, Goodenough, “Kerry Misleads in Saying There's No Comparison Between 
Iran and N. Korea Nuke Deals”, 25.11. 2013 http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-
goodenough/kerry-misleads-saying-theres-no-comparison-between-iran-and-n-
korea#sthash.YInGfm7I.dpuf, 11.03. 2014. 
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Korea's nuclear arsenal, while Iran has both similarities. 
Although Iran has no nuclear arsenal, he can strike militarily in 
retaliation Israeli and American targets. The confrontation could 
escalate to a destabilizing regional war in the Middle East, which 
is volatile and all this does not guarantee that Iran will not be 
able to rebuild its nuclear facilities several years later. The worst 
scenario is that premature military action will inspire outrage in 
Iran and uncertainty, which probably will force its government 
to launch a full scale of a nuclear weapons program, which has 
not yet been made a decision. Reason for optimism, unlike the 
"kingdom of solitude" of North Korea, is that Iran is integrated 
into the global economy and dependent on international trade. 
Therefore, economic sanctions should give much more effect 
with Iran than to the DPRK. With Iran continuing negotiations 
might provide an opportunity to halt a nascent nuclear 
program.12 
A large part of the current diplomatic progress is partly the 
election of the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. Soon after his 
inauguration, the US and Iran have had a meeting directly 
engaged at the highest levels since 1979.  Although Iran's 
supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini remains the ultimate 
decision-making power in Tehran, he responded positively to 
Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to allow the necessary 
time and space to an agreement.13 
                                                     
12 Sahay, Usha, “ A Tale of Two Outliers: Comparing Options on Iran and North 
Korea”, Lobelog Foerign Policy, 22.02.2013, http://www.lobelog.com/a-tale-of-two-
outliers-comparing-options-on-iran-and-north-korea. 
13 On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be 
exclusively peaceful. October 18, 2015 marked Adoption Day of the JCPOA, the date 
on which the JCPOA came into effect and participants began taking steps necessary 
to implement their JCPOA commitments. January 16, 2016, marks Implementation 
Day of the JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified 
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North Korea is not in such level of accountability, it doesn’t 
transfer to other Korean authorities where Kim family rules with 
an iron fist since the early 50th of last century. Negotiations 
between International stakeholders and North Korea began after 
DPRK was advanced very close to nuclear weapons. When the 
agreement was signed in 1994, North Korea already had a heavy 
operational water reactor; manufacturing enough to complete a 
nuclear weapon. A major part of the interim agreement with Iran 
was freezing progress on heavy water plant at Arak, which also 
will be able to produce plutonium. North Korea was determined 
to build a bomb, while Iran's leaders still have time to take a 
decision on making nuclear weapons.14 
According to UN and the US officials’ infromartions, North 
Korea has the ability to produce dozens of nuclear bombs, while 
Iran on the other hand has only developed the technology to 
enrich uranium. Iran has also an agreement with the IAEA, 
which still remains in force, which allows officials to visit Iranian 
fuel nuclear- reactors. Pyongyang, on the other hand has 
expelled IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon complex in 2002. 
At the moment, North Korea is much more unpredictable and 
dangerous entity than Iran. Unlike Iran, where religion has more 
value than the state, North Korea cares much more for its own 
survival, which may be the believable fact to use its bomb.15 
                                                     
that Iran has implemented its key nuclear-related measures described in the JCPOA, 
and the Secretary State has confirmed the IAEA’s verification. As a result of Iran 
verifiably meeting its nuclear commitments, the United States and the EU have lifted 
nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, as described in the JCPOA. For more visit, US. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/. 
14 Hayes, Brown, “5 Reasons Why The Iran Deal Isn’t North Korea Redux”, Think 
Progress,25.11.2013, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/11/25/2989171/iran-
deal-north-korea-redux/ #, 22.02. 2014. 
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Mainly the EU and the United States are deeply concerned 
about the situation in Iran than in North Korea. A nuclear Iran is 
considered to be potentially dangerous not only because Europe 
lies geographically within range of Iran's missiles, but also the 
region where Iran is mined stretches tense and volatile 
confrontations. In particular, Israel is determined to prevent 
Tehran from acquiring the bomb. A nuclear Iran could lead to a 
new arms race in the Middle East and further destabilizing the 
region, which lies closer to the old continent. European 
diplomatic power will be tested depending on how Iran is closer 
to finalize its nuclear program. The divisions between the EU 
countries are likely to grow about what to do next, as well as with 
Europe's main ally (the US). Regarding the North Korea, the 
European Union has drawn more attention in terms of non-
proliferation over the last decade, but taken in consideration 
geographically distance located far from the Korean peninsula,  
for European policy makers is at least less strategically important 
than Iran.16 
If we compare the actions taken by the international 
community, particularly by US as global leader, clearly it shows 
that the US government, not being able to eliminate nuclear 
weapons in North Korea. In fact, this program is further 
expanded under the Gorge W Bush administration. According to 
data based on public literature, during the past six years, North 
Korea's nuclear reserves were added by a sufficient quantity of 
material, for a bomb or two or up to six to twelve bombs. 
Yongbyon reactor is reactivated, so that up to spring 2007 has 
produced enough plutonium and if divided that material then it 
can produce one or two bombs per year. So one of the questions 
                                                     
16 Renard, Thomas, “Partnering for a nuclear-safe world: the EU, its strategic partners 
and nuclear non-proliferation, European Strategic Partnership Observatory”, ISSN 
2254-6391 (print) ISSN: ESPO working pape,r n.3 October 2013, The ESPO 
website.strategicpartnerships.eu. 10.11.2014. 
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that we may face obstacles in replaying and in its clarification is: 
What is the sum of the amount of plutonium that North Korea possesses 
today? Is it able to use this material to produce nuclear weapons, and if 
so, how? What is location of nuclear plutonium or any other weapons? 
What is the physical size of a weapon? A produced arsenal or ballistic 
missiles from North Korea, or that can only deliver in the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ) with cars? What is the exact status of the enrichment 
program? Does North Korea give any technical knowledge (knowledge), 
material or nuclear weapons to third parties? None of these questions 
are not getting the exact answer up today. These are the main 
negotiation challenges with North Korea.17 Moreover, even if 
such weapons will never be used in the future, or will not cause 
an accident, the utter goal of their nuclear programs pose a 
challenge everyday to a global nuclear nonproliferation regime 
stability, particularly to the nuclear agreement, the Non-
proliferation Treaty of nuclear Weapons (NPT) -that have helped 
in recent decades to contain the threat posed by the rampant 
spread of nuclear weapons and their supporting technologies. 
Although in recent five year review of the NPT in 2005, 
concluded in that way that cast doubt on its importance in the 
future, Iran has accelerated full nuclear fuel cycle program, while 
North Korea conducted a nuclear test. Moreover, North Korea 
has completed a diplomatic process, despite the fact that it has 
issued NPT. Iran remains a constant threat to the region if 
international agreement. Expansion of nuclear and missile 
capabilities of Iran and North Korea change facts on the ground. 
Iran has abandoned a slow approach to uranium enrichment and 
North crust accelerated its program before re-entry multilateral 
diplomacy in February 2007. The two countries have cooperated 
with the nuclear black market, and the Pakistani scientist A.Q. 
                                                     
17 Patrick M. Cronin., Double trouble: Iran and North Korea as challenges to 
international security, Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, 
CT 06881, 2008, pg. 108-111. 
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Khan18 has provided both these countries with the gas centrifuge 
technology needed to create a nuclear bomb. If these two 
countries are allowed to possess nuclear weapons, then some 
analysts predict that a second nuclear age is inevitable in the 
Middle East and Eastern Asia. Henry Kissinger writes that "The 
world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will 
become a standard and part of national armament and these will fall 




Both of these cases are different because each country (North 
Korea) already possesses nuclear weapons, while the other (Iran) 
in "continuity" is an attempt to come to its nuclear capabilities. 
So the question priory rises to the implementation of 
disarmament article of nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although 
it is not a member of the NPT and to the Iranian nuclear program 
raised the issue of the peaceful use of its nuclear program. 
Military threat in North Korea's case does not the question at all 
as an option by the international community, because the 
consequences would be catastrophic for the region. As in the case 
of Iran, the threat of the use of force combined with active 
diplomacy could and so far has achieved the goal of international 
                                                     
18 A.Q. Khan has become a pop icon for contemporary proliferation, and is widely 
blamed for the existence of Pakistan’s, Iran’s, Libya’s, and North Korea’s gas 
centrifuge programs. Technology now dominates how policymakers think about 
proliferation, and many share the view that, “with the exception of a few advanced 
industrialized countries, a state’s ability to build nuclear weapons generally hinges on 
its ability to and an international supplier.” For more see at Kemp, R.Scott.“The 
Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes.”International Security 38, no. 4 (April 
2014) , pg,  39-40. 
19 Patrick M. Cronin., Double trouble: Iran and North Korea as challenges to 
international security, Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, 
CT 06881, 2008, pg. 108-111. 
North Korea’s and Iranian Nuclear Program- Comperative aproach 
64  Thesis, no.1, 2016      
community almost at the moment of writing this paper. 
Implementing coercive diplomacy instruments as sanctions, 
pressure, and threats with military intervention, even though 
they have given their effects, have not given the expected results 
as to halt the advance of the North Korea’s nuclear program, and 
have not forced the state authorities to sit at the negotiating table. 
Relations between the United States and other negotiating 
partners with North Korea, as well as diplomatic means used so 
far in resolving the nuclear crisis can be assumed that: the most 
preferred alternatives in resolving the Korean crisis remains 
active diplomacy. By implementing this diplomacy the United 
States as the dominant power of the world, "negotiating power" 
should take the initiative and communicate directly with the new 
leadership (Kim Young-un). Above all, North Korea must agree 
to limit gradually throughout program enrichment and 
disarmament. The US and its negotiating partners must agree to 
gradually eliminate its nuclear weapons, on the other hand, the 
international community to lift some of the most severe 
sanctions. The US and its negotiating partners should agree on a 
step by step process to remove of all UN sanctions in response to 
progress further in diplomatic path and to integrate North Korea 
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